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1 Introduction
This paper introduces downward wage rigidities in a dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium model where forward-looking agents optimally set their wages taking into ac-
count the future implications of their choices. A closed-form solution for the long-run
Phillips curve is derived. The in‡ation-unemployment trade-o¤ is shown to depend
on various factors, and particularly on the extent of macroeconomic volatility. The
paper contributes to the argument that modern monetary models may underestimate
the bene…ts of in‡ation and as such they may suggest an optimal in‡ation rate that
is too low (close to zero).
The conventional view argues against the presence of a long-run trade-o¤ and in
favor of price stability. Fifty years ago, Phillips (1958) showed evidence of a negative
relationship between the unemployment rate and the changes in nominal wages for
97 years of British data, while Samuelson and Solow (1960) reported a similar …t for
US data. The contributions of Friedman (1968), Phelps (1968), and Lucas (1973),
as well as the oil shocks of the 1970s, cast serious doubts on the validity of the
Phillips curve. Although the empirical controversy has yet to settled down (see Ball
et al., 1988; King and Watson, 1994; and Bullard and Keating, 1995), the textbook
approach to monetary policy is based on the absence of a long-run trade-o¤ between
in‡ation and unemployment: the attempt to take advantage of the short-run trade-o¤
would only generate costly in‡ation in the long run, so that price stability should be
the objective of central banks (see for example Mankiw, 2001, and Mishkin, 2008).1
A wide range of recent monetary models exhibit a long-run relationship between
in‡ation and real activity, due to (symmetric) nominal rigidities and asynchronized
price-setting behavior in an intertemporal setup (see among others Goodfriend and
King, 1997, and Woodford, 2003).2 Nonetheless, this literature indicates that the op-
timal long-run in‡ation rate should be close to zero and unemployment at the natural
rate:3 even a moderate rate of in‡ation imposes high costs in terms of unemployment
because …rms that can adjust prices set a high markup in order to protect future
1For a recent critical survey of the macroeconomic literature see Blanchard (2008).
2State-dependent pricing would tend to weaken the long-run relationship between in‡ation and
unemployment (see for example Golosov and Lucas, 2007).
3See Khan, King and Wolman (2003), Wolman (2001) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). See
Wyplosz (2001) for an empirical analysis on this topic.
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pro…ts from the erosion e¤ect of in‡ation;4 moreover, in‡ation creates costly price
dispersion because of the asynchronized price setting. However, virtually no central
bank is adopting a policy of price stability, even though the number of countries
adopting in‡ation targeting has been rapidly increasing over the past decade and a
half.
This recent literature has mainly introduced symmetric price rigidities, while one
of the most popular arguments against a zero-in‡ation policy relies on the existence
of downward nominal rigidities.5 A lower bound on wages and prices keeps them from
falling and induces a drift: a negative demand shock would just reduce in‡ation if
in‡ation remains positive, but would induce unemployment if prices needed to fall. A
monetary policy committed to price stability can achieve its objective only by a very
restrictive policy that increases the unemployment rate. It follows that at low in‡ation
rates there is a high sacri…ce-ratio of pursuing de‡ationary policies and the marginal
bene…t of in‡ation as “greasing” the labor market could be high. Akerlof et al.
(1996) o¤ered an extensive discussion of these issues and a macroeconomic model with
downward wage rigidities, thus formally deriving a trade-o¤ between unemployment
and in‡ation. But, at that time several researchers doubted the relevance of wage
rigidities at low in‡ation and suggested the need for more international evidence (see
for example the comments to Akerlof et al., 1996).
There is now a strong body of evidence indicating the presence of downward
wage rigidities across a wide spectrum of countries, often even at low in‡ation, and
several explanations have been put forward for the existence of such rigidities, such
as fairness, social norms, and labor market institutions (next Section surveys the
literature).6 Consistently, recent works have found that the “grease” e¤ect of in‡ation
is more relevant in countries with highly regulated labor market (Loboguerrero and
4It is a questionable assumption to impose price rigidity even at high in‡ation rates. But, this
is a features of time-dependent price-setting models. A model with state-dependent pricing would
instead imply a vertical Phillips curve at high in‡ation rates.
5Already in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Keynes leverages on the
fact that workers usually resist a reduction of money-wages to question the conclusion of the classical
analysis with regards the existence of a unique frictional rate of unemployment. Numerous authors,
from Samuelson and Solow (1960) and Tobin (1972) to Akerlof (2007), stressed their importance for
the existence of a long-run trade-o¤ between in‡ation and unemployment.
6Evidence of downward rigidities on goods prices is not as conclusive (see for example Peltzman,
2000; Alvarez et al., 2006; and Chapter 18 in Blinder et al., 1998).
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Panizza, 2006). It is thus not surprising that several studies on the U.S. labor market
…nd that, despite a clear evidence of the presence of downward nominal rigidities, the
evidence in favor of a “grease” e¤ect of in‡ation is weaker in this country (Groshen
and Schweitzer, 1999, and Card and Hyslop, 1996). However, evidence for the U.S.
should not be used to dismiss the implications of such rigidities in other countries.
In this paper, we introduce downward wage rigidities in an otherwise dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model with forward-looking optimizing agents that
enjoy consumption of goods and experience disutility from labor when working for
pro…t-maximizing …rms. Labor and goods markets are characterized by monopolis-
tic competition, and goods prices are fully ‡exible. The economy is subject to an
aggregate productivity shock and to stochastic perturbations to nominal spending.
The most important novelty with respect to the literature is the derivation of a
closed-form solution for the long-run averages of in‡ation and unemployment, i.e. the
long-run Phillips curve. The paper emphasizes the dynamic implications of downward
wage rigidities in a model otherwise similar to those that have been employed to argue
against the existence or relevance of a long-run trade-o¤. We …nd that the Phillips
curve is almost vertical for medium-to-high in‡ation rates but can display a signi…cant
trade-o¤ at low in‡ation rates, consistently with the literature on downward nominal
rigidities.
The paper also highlights the importance of intertemporal relative-price adjust-
ments (as opposed to intratemporal ones) for the long-run trade-o¤. Indeed, the
standard view on the implication of downward wage rigidities for the Phillips curve
(from Tobin, 1972, to Akerlof et al., 1996) is based on the intratemporal relative-price
adjustment across sectors. In an intertemporal framework, this paper shows that the
presence of downward wage rigidities would generate a long-run Phillips curve even
in a one-sector model, as it would hamper the relative price adjustment over time.
Adding multiple sectors would simply increase the need for relative price adjustments
(along the cross-sectional dimension) and enhance the Phillips curve. The limited ex-
tent of intertemporal relative-price adjustments opens the way for an important role
of macroeconomic stabilization policies.
Indeed, an important determinant of the trade-o¤ at low in‡ation rate is given by
the volatility of nominal spending growth. Thus the in‡ation-unemployment trade-o¤
should be di¤erent across countries experiencing di¤erent macroeconomic volatility
(and not only across countries with di¤erent degrees of rigidity in the labor market as
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discussed in the literature). Hence, it is unlikely that a similar in‡ation target would
be ideal for all countries: countries experiencing higher macroeconomic volatility
may want to target a higher in‡ation rate in order to reduce long-run unemployment.
Conversely, they could emphasize stabilization policies in order to achieve a more
favorable unemployment-in‡ation trade-o¤. This result contrasts with the view that
the gains from appropriate stabilization policies conducted by monetary and …scal
authorities are negligible, as found in Lucas (2003). In the framework we propose,
the role of macroeconomic policies in stabilizing the shocks might have important
…rst-order e¤ects on unemployment at low in‡ation rates. Moreover, even for the
same country the trade-o¤ can change over time if macroeconomic volatility changes.
Downward wage in‡exibility in the presence of a forward-looking behavior implies
an endogenous upward wage rigidity at low in‡ation rates. When adjusting wages
upward in the face of a positive shock, wage setters have to take into account the
future consequences of their wage choices. Indeed, they do not want to be constrained
by too high wages in the future in case unfavorable shocks would require a wage cut.
This e¤ect mainly holds at low in‡ation, as at high in‡ation the downward rigidities
are not e¤ectively binding.
This mechanism also implies that there is a trade-o¤ not only between mean wage
in‡ation and unemployment, but also between their volatilities, as common also in
the literature on monetary policy rules evaluation (see Clarida et al., 1999, Svensson,
1999, and Taylor, 1999). Also the trade-o¤ between volatilities, and not just that
between …rst moments, can be improved upon via stabilization policies aimed at
reducing the volatility of nominal spending growth.
Beside the work of Akerlof et al. (1996), our paper is related to a few recent
contributions. Elsby (2008) o¤ers a partial equilibrium model where downward nom-
inal rigidities arise from a negative e¤ects of wage cuts on …rm’s productivity and
highlights the endogenous tendency for upward rigidity of wages in a dynamic model.
Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2007), and more recently Fahr and Smets (2008) and Fagan
and Messina (2008), present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with
asymmetric costs to wage adjustments, but do not derive a closed-form solution for
the long-run Phillips curve.7
7Andersen (2001) presents a static model which can be solved in a closed form, while Bhaskar
(2003) o¤ers a framework that endogenizes downward price rigidities. Our work is also closely
related to the literature on irreversible investment, since a dynamic problem in which wages cannot
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 o¤ers a theoretical and empirical
overview of the literature on downward rigidities. Section 3 describes the model.
Sections 4 and 5 present the solutions under ‡exible and downward-rigid wages, re-
spectively. Section 6 solves for the long-run Phillips curve. Section 7 discusses the
implication for volatilities. Section 8 draws conclusions.
2 Overview of the literature on downward wage
rigidities
As the key innovative assumption of the paper is the adoption of downward wage
rigidities, this Section brie‡y discusses the conceptual underpinnings and the most
relevant empirical evidence. Recent contributions have o¤ered rationales for why
wages do not fall. Bewley (1999) points to arguments related to fairness and social
norms: …rms are reluctant to cut wages even if unemployed labor is available, as
they fear a negative repercussion on workers morale and eventually on productivity
(workers may be more likely to shirk and the best workers may choose to leave the
…rm). His claims were substantiated by interviews related to the 1991-92 recession
in Connecticut. Holden (1997, 2004), building on MacLeod and Malcomson (1993),
present a complementary view, pointing to the role of labor market structure and
institutions: costly renegotiations, unionization, employment protection legislation,
and holdout in wage negotiations (the presumption of the continuation of contracts
in the absence of renegotiations) make it di¢cult for …rms to impose wage cuts on
workers. Note also, that the psychological underpinnings of downward wage rigidities
(especially those in terms of fairness) might be related to the presence of money
illusion, which has received substantial support in experimental studies (see Sha…r et
al. 1997).
Since the seminal contribution of Akerlof et al. (1996) revived the macroeconomic
implications of downward wage rigidities, there have been numerous empirical studies
con…rming the presence of such rigidities for a wide variety of countries: nominal
wages rarely fall, as indicated by the distribution of wage changes at the micro level.
For evidence on the U.S., see for example Lebow et al. (2003). Akerlof (2007, footnote
fall is similar to a problem in which capital cannot fall (see Abel and Eberly, 1996; Bertola, 1998;
Bertola and Caballero, 1994; Dixit, 1991; Dumas, 1991; Pindyck, 1988; and Stokey, 2006).
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61) and Holden (2004, Section V) cite more than two dozens papers over the past
decade providing consistent evidence for about ten countries. Dickens et al. (2007)
summarize the …ndings of the International Wage Flexibility Project sponsored by
the European Central Bank, pointing to clear evidence of both nominal and real
downward wage rigidity in a number of countries. Within the context of the Wage
Dynamics Network of the Eurosystem, Du Caju et al. (2008) con…rm and update
some of these …ndings, quantifying the extent of downward wage rigidity across a
number of European countries. Moreover, Gottschalk (2004) …nds that measurement
error in wages reported in surveys may lead to an underestimation of the extent of
downward wage rigidity by roughly a factor of three.
Rigidities are likely to be stronger for countries with more labor market distortions,
in light of explanations related to labor-market institutions (such as Holden, 2004 and
1997). Indeed, Dickens et al (2007) …nd that the “extent of union presence in wage
bargaining plays a role in explaining di¤ering degrees of rigidities among countries”.
Also, Agell and Bennmarker (2002) …nd stronger evidence of downward rigidities for
Sweden than what Fehr and Gotte (2005) …nd for Switzerland, which is in line with
the fact that the Swedish labor market is more rigid than the Swiss one.
Several authors have conjectured that downward wage rigidities may vanish in
low in‡ation environment (see Ball and Mankiw, 1994, and the comments to Akerlof
et al., 1996). Contrary to such speculations, recent evidence shows that even at
lor in‡ation downward wage rigidities are binding (Agell and Lundborg, 2003, for
Sweden; Fehr and Gotte, 2005, for Switzerland). Even after extensive periods of very
low in‡ation or de‡ation, as in Japan, it is not clear that wages would become more
‡exible downwards:8 Kimura and Ueda (2001) …nd preliminary evidence of some
wage decline, but Yasui and Takenaka (2005) question the robustness of their result
and conclude that “nominal wages remained rigid to downward pressure by expected
de‡ation”. Hence, if one excludes crises period (like the “Great Depression”, when
wages fell while unemployment reached extremely high levels) there is no evidence
suggesting that in a low-in‡ation environment downward rigidities would vanish and
the fairness and labor-market-institution arguments would no longer be valid. In
section 5.3, our analysis would anyhow relax the assumption of strong downward
rigidities, in order to accommodate the possibility of some decline in wages at low
8Note that Broda and Weinstein (2007) …nd that Japanese de‡ation may have been even twice
as large as o¢cially reported.
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in‡ation.
There is some evidence that …rms may use other margins of ‡exibility (bonuses,
non-pay bene…ts, promotions, new hires) to reduce labor costs when they face a neg-
ative demand shock. For example, Farès and Lemieux (2001) …nd that wage adjust-
ments in Canada are mainly obtained via new hires. These factors could dampen the
unemployment consequences of a negative demand shock, thus steepening the Phillips
curve. It is, however, an empirical matter the extent to which such alternative cost
reduction can substitute for reduction in labor, and so far the evidence indicate that
the rigidities are still relevant. For example, Babeky et al. (2008) …nd that in a wide
variety of countries …rms subject to downward real wage rigidities have less capac-
ity to use these alternative margins, while Holden and Wulfsberg (2008) document
the presence of downward rigidities in industry-level wage data for OECD countries,
suggesting that "…rm behaviour and market mechanisms may diminish, but do not
remove, rigidity at the individual level" (p. 31).
Overall, it is important to notice that recent studies encompassing a wide set
of countries, such as Dickens et al. (2008) and Du Caju et al. (2008), …nd that
downward wage rigidities have a negative impact on employment.
3 The model
We describe a closed-economy model in which there are a continuum of in…nitely
lived households and …rms (both in a [0,1] interval). Each household derives utility
from the consumption of a continuum of goods aggregated using a Dixit-Stiglitz
consumption index, and disutility from supplying one of the varieties of labor in
a monopolistic-competitive market. The model assumes the presence of downward
nominal rigidities: wages are chosen by optimizing households under the constraint
that they cannot fall (this assumption will be relaxed in Section 5.3). Firms hire all
varieties of labor to produce one of the continuum of consumption goods and operate
in a monopolistic-competitive market where prices are set without any friction. The
economy is subject to two aggregate shocks: a productivity and a nominal spending
shock. The productivity shock is denoted by At; whose logarithmic at is distributed
as a Brownian motion with drift g and variance ¾2a
dat = gdt+ ¾adBa;t (1)
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where Ba;t denotes a standard Brownian motion with zero drift and unit variance.
The nominal spending shock is denoted by ~Yt whose logarithmic ~yt is also distributed
as a Brownian motion, now with drift µ and variance ¾2y
d~yt = µdt+ ¾ydBy;t (2)
where dBy;t is a standard Brownian motion with zero drift and unit variance that
might be correlated with dBa;t.
Household j has preferences over time given by
Et0
·Z 1
t0
e¡½(t¡t0)
µ
lnCjt ¡
l1+´t (j)
1 + ´
¶
dt
¸
(3)
where the expectation operator Et0(¢) is de…ned by the shock processes (1) and (2),
and ½ > 0 is the rate of time preference. Current utility depends on the Dixit-Stiglitz
consumption aggregate of the continuum of goods produced by the …rms operating
in the economy
Cjt ´
·Z 1
0
cjt(i)
µp
µp¡1di
¸ µp¡1
µp
where µp > 0 is the elasticity of substitution among consumption goods and c
j
t(i)
is household j’s consumption of the variety produced by …rm i. An appropriate
consumption-based price index is de…ned as
Pt ´
·Z 1
0
pt(i)
1¡µpdi
¸ 1
1¡µp
;
where pt(i) is the price of the single good i.
The utility ‡ow is logarithmic in the consumption aggregate. In (3), labor disu-
tility is assumed to be isoelastic with respect to the labor supplied lt(j), with ´ ¸ 0
measuring the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.9 Household j’s intertem-
poral budget constraint is given by
Et0
½Z 1
t0
QtPtC
j
t dt
¾
· Et0
½Z 1
t0
Qt
£
wt(j)lt(j) + ¦
j
t
¤
dt
¾
(4)
where Qt is the stochastic nominal discount factor in capital markets where claims
to monetary units are traded; wt(j) is the nominal wage for labor of variety j; and
¦jt is the pro…t income of household j.
9These preferences are consistent with a balanced-growth path since we are assuming a drift in
technology.
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Starting with the consumption decisions, household j chooses goods demand,
fcjt(i)g; to maximize (3) under the intertemporal budget constraint (4), taking prices
as given. The …rst-order conditions for consumption choices imply
e¡½(t¡t0)C¡1t = ÂQtPt (5)
ct(i)
Ct
=
µ
pt(i)
Pt
¶¡µp
(6)
where the multiplier Â does not vary over time. The index j is omitted from the con-
sumption’s …rst-order conditions, because we are assuming complete markets through
a set of state-contingent claims to monetary units.
Before we turn to the labor supply decision, we analyze the …rms’ problem. We
assume that the labor used to produce each good i is a CES aggregate, L(i), of the
continuum of individual types of labor j de…ned by
Lt(i) ´
·Z 1
0
ldt (j)
µw¡1
µw dj
¸ µw
µw¡1
with an elasticity of substitution µw > 1. Here ldt (j) is the demand for labor of type j.
Given that each di¤erentiated type of labor is supplied in a monopolistic-competitive
market, the demand for labor of type j on the part of wage-taking …rms is given by
ldt (j) =
µ
wt(j)
Wt
¶¡µw
Lt; (7)
where Wt is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate wage index
Wt ´
·Z 1
0
wt(j)
1¡µwdj
¸ 1
1¡µw
; (8)
and aggregate demand for labor Lt is de…ned as
Lt ´
Z 1
0
Lt(i)di:
We assume a common linear technology for the production of all goods
yt(i) = AtLt(i):
Pro…ts of the generic …rm i, ¦t(i), are given by
¦t(i) = pt(i)yt(i)¡WtLt(i):
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In a monopolistic-competitive market, given (6), each …rm faces the demand
yt(i) =
µ
pt(i)
Pt
¶¡µp
Yt
where total output is equal in equilibrium to aggregate consumption (Yt = Ct). Since
…rms can freely adjust their prices, standard optimality conditions under monopolistic
competition imply that all …rms set the same price
pt(i) = Pt = ¹p
Wt
At
(9)
where ¹p ´ µp=(µp ¡ 1) > 1 denotes the mark-up of prices over marginal costs. An
implication of (9) is that labor income is a constant fraction of total income
~Yt = PtYt = ¹pWtLt: (10)
Given …rms’ demand (7), a household of type j chooses labor supply in a monopolistic-
competitive market to maximize (3) under the intertemporal budget constraint (4)
taking as given prices fQtg; fPtg and the other relevant aggregate variables. An
equivalent formulation of the labor choice is the maximization of the following objec-
tive
Et0
·Z 1
t0
e¡½(t¡t0)¼(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)dt
¸
(11)
by choosing fwt(j)g1t=t0 ; where
¼(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt) ´ 1
¹p
µ
wt(j)
Wt
¶1¡µw
¡ 1
1 + ´
µ
wt(j)
Wt
¶¡(1+´)µw Ã ~Yt
¹pWt
!1+´
:
Households would then supply as much labor as demanded by …rms in (7) at the
chosen wages. In deriving ¼(¢) we have used (5), (7) and (10). Note that the function
¼(¢) is homogeneous of degree zero in (wt(j), Wt, ~Yt).
4 Flexible wages
We …rst analyze the case in which wages are set without any friction, so that they
can be moved freely and fall if necessary. With ‡exible wages, maximization of
10
(11) corresponds to per-period maximization and implies the following optimality
condition
¼w(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt) = 0
where ¼w(¢) is the derivative of ¼(¢) with respect to the …rst argument. Since this holds
for each j and there is a unique equilibrium, then wt(j) = Wt: With our preference
speci…cation we thus obtain that nominal wages in the ‡exible-wage case, W ft ; are
proportional to nominal spending
W ft = ¹
1
1+´
w ¹
¡ ´
1+´
p
~Yt (12)
where the factor of proportionality is given by the wage mark-up, de…ned by ¹w ´
µw=(µw¡1), and by the elasticity of labor supply. We can also obtain the ‡exible-wage
equilibrium level of aggregate labor, Lf ; using (10) and (12)
Lf = (¹p¹w)
¡ 1
1+´ ;
which is a constant and just a function of the price and wage mark-ups as well as of
the labor elasticity. It follows that the unemployment rate, uft , is given by
uf = 1¡ Lf ;
where total labor force (equal to 1) is de…ned as the employment that would prevail
if labor and product markets monopolistic distortions were absent (¹w = ¹p = 1).
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Consumption and output follow from the production function. Prices, P ft , are given
by
P ft = ¹p
W ft
At
:
In this frictionless world, prices and wages move proportionally to nominal spending
and unemployment is always constant. The Phillips curve is vertical.
5 Downward nominal wage rigidity
When nominal wages cannot fall below the level reached in the previous period, an
additional condition needs to be taken into account: the constraint that dwt(j) should
10In our model, workers are identical and unemployment is de…ned as the gap between the aggre-
gate hours actually worked and the working hours in a world without wage rigidities and without
labor and product-market distortions.
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be non-negative (Section 5.3 will explore alternative degrees of downward rigidities).11
The objective is then to maximize (11) under
dwt(j) ¸ 0 (13)
with wt0 > 0. In other words, agents choose a non-decreasing positive nominal wage
path to maximize (11): Let us de…ne the value function V (¢) for this problem as
V (wt(j);Wt; ~Yt) = maxfw¿ (j)g2W
Et
½Z 1
t
e¡½(¿¡t)¼(w¿ (j);W¿ ; ~Y¿ )d¿
¾
;
where W is the set of non-decreasing positive sequences fw¿ (j)g1t . In the appendix
we show that along the optimal path the following smooth-pasting condition holds
(see Dixit, 1991)
Vw(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt) = 0 if dwt(j) > 0;
Vw(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt) · 0 if dwt(j) = 0;
where Vw(¢) is the derivative of V (¢) with respect to the …rst argument.
Moreover the maximization problem is concave and the above conditions are also
su¢cient to characterize a global optimum as shown in the appendix. It follows that
all wage setters are going to set the same wage, wt(j) = Wt for all j: We de…ne
v(Wt; ~Yt) ´ Vw(Wt;Wt; ~Yt); and then W ( ~Yt) as the function that solves
v(W ( ~Yt); ~Yt) = 0:
In particular W ( ~Yt) represents the current desired wage taking into account future
downward-rigidity constraints, but not the current one (i.e. if agents were free to
choose the current wage, even below the previous-period wage, considering that future
wages cannot fall). The agent will set Wt = W ( ~Yt) whenever dWt ¸ 0, so that actual
wages (Wt) are the maximum of previous-period wages and current desired wages. It
follows that actual wages cannot fall below current desired wages, i.e. Wt ¸ W ( ~Yt):
Either they are above the desired level, when the downward-rigidity constraint is
binding, or they are equal, when an adjustment occurs. In particular, we show that
11The downward-rigidity constraint is purely exogenous in this model and could be rationalized
by considering every worker as associated with a union that does not allow the wage to decline for
reasons related to fairness and social norms (Bewley, 1999, and Akerlof, 2007).
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the desired wage is always below the ‡exible-case wage:
W ( ~Yt) = c(µ; ¾
2
y; ´; ½) ¢ ¹
1
1+´
w ¹
¡ ´
1+´
p
~Yt (14)
= c(µ; ¾2y; ´; ½) ¢W ft
where c(¢) is a non-negative function of the model’s parameters as follows
c(µ; ¾2y; ´; ½) ´
Ã
µ + 1
2
°(µ; ¾2y; ½) ¢ ¾2y
µ + 1
2
(°(µ; ¾2y; ½) + ´ + 1) ¢ ¾2y
! 1
1+´
· 1
and °(¢) being the following non-negative function
° =
¡µ +
p
µ2 + 2½¾2
¾2
as derived in the appendix.12
Agents’ optimizing behavior in the presence of exogenous downward wage rigidi-
ties implies an endogenous tendency for upward wage rigidities. When wages adjust
upward, they adjust to the desired levelW ( ~Yt); which is always below the ‡exible-case
wage by a factor c(¢). Indeed, optimizing wage setters choose an adjustment rule that
tries to minimize the ine¢ciencies of downward wage in‡exibility. Wage setters are
worried to be stuck with an excessively high wage should future unfavorable shocks re-
quire a wage decline (as downward wage rigidities would imply a fall in employment).
As a consequence, optimizing agents refrain from excessive wage increases when fa-
vorable shocks require upward adjustment, pushing current employment above the
‡exible-case level.
Note that the fact that desired wages are always below the ‡exible-case wage does
not imply that actual wages are always below the ‡exible-case wage. Indeed, when
the downward-rigidity constraint is binding, actual wages are higher than desired
wages and are likely to be higher (and employment lower) than in the ‡exible case.
As we will see in the next section, in the long run, unemployment would be higher
on average then in the ‡exible-case wage.
The reaction of nominal wages to a nominal expenditure shock (as indicated by
c(¢)), when wages can adjust upward, depends on the properties of the nominal ex-
penditure process (i.e. its mean and variance), the rate of time preference, and on the
12It is possible that the desired wage, W ( ~Yt); falls below the one associated with full employment.
While temporary overemployment is not unrealistic, in the appendix we also solve the model with
the additional constraint lt(j) · 1 for each j.
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Figure 1: Plot of the function c(¢) de…ned in (14) against the mean of nominal
spending growth, µ; and for di¤erent standard deviations of nominal spending growth,
¾y. µ and ¾y are in percent and at annual rates. ´ = 2:5; ½ = 0:01 and uf = 6%.
elasticity of labor supply. In particular the wage reaction is weaker (c(¢) is low) when
the variance of nominal expenditure growth is high (¾2 is large), when the mean of
nominal expenditure growth is small (µ is small), when agents discount less the future
(½ is low), and when the elasticity of labor is higher (´ is low). First, when shocks
are very volatile, future unfavorable shocks can be very large and hence very costly
in terms of unemployment should the wage constraint be binding. As a limiting case,
when ¾2 = 0; then c(¢) = 1 and W ( ~Yt) = W ft . Second, when the mean of nominal
spending growth is low, it is better to have a muted reaction, since it is more likely
that even small shocks would lead wages to hit the lower bound. When µ becomes
very large, the drift in nominal spending growth is very sizable and the lower bound
is not really e¤ective, so that c(¢) gets close to 1. In this case, it is unlikely that
downward wage in‡exibility is going to be binding so that the ‡exible-wage level of
employment will be achieved most of the time. Third, when wage setters discount
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more the future (high values of ½) they will be less concerned with the future conse-
quences of current wage decisions, and would set wages (when the downward rigidity
is not binding) at a level close to the ‡exible-wage level, implying, ceteris paribus,
higher unemployment in the long run. Indeed when ½ increases, °(¢) increases, and
c(¢) can get close to one. In this case, when shocks are unfavorable employment falls
(due to the downward wage rigidities), but when shocks are favorable employment
does not exceed much the ‡exible-wage level. Fourth, when labor supply is less elastic
(´ is high), wage setters prefer to avoid large ‡uctuations in hours worked so they set
higher wages when adjusting (c(¢) gets close to one), thus reducing the variability of
employment ‡uctuation but also average employment.13
In Figure 1 we plot c(¢) as a function of the mean of the log of nominal spending
growth, µ; with di¤erent assumptions on the standard deviation of nominal spending
growth, ¾y, ranging from 0% to 20% at annual rates. The parameters’ calibration is
based on a discretized quarterly model. In particular, the rate of time preference ½ is
equal to 0:01 as standard in the literature implying a 4% real interest rate at annual
rates. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is set equal to 0:4, as it is done in several
studies, thus ´ = 2:5.14 When ¾y = 0%, c(¢) = 1. With positive standard deviations,
c(¢) decreases as µ decreases. The decline in c is larger the higher is the standard
deviation of the nominal spending shock, as previously discussed.
6 The Phillips curve
6.1 Long-run Phillips curve
We can now solve for the equilibrium level of employment and characterize the
in‡ation-unemployment trade-o¤ in the presence of downward nominal wage rigidi-
ties. Equation (10) implies that
Lt =
1
¹p
~Yt
Wt
:
Since we have shown that Wt ¸ c(¢)¹
1
1+´
w ¹
¡ ´
1+´
p
~Yt; it follows that 0 · Lt · Lf=c(¢):
The existence of downward wage rigidities endogenously adds an upward barrier on
13Productivity shocks do not a¤ect the desired wage as their employment e¤ects are neutralized
by the fully ‡exible prices.
14See for example Smets and Wouters (2003).
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the employment level. Since ~yt follows a Brownian motion with drift µ and standard
deviation ¾y; also lt = lnLt is going to follow a Brownian motion but with a re‡ecting
barrier at ln(Lf=c(¢)). The probability distribution function for such process can be
computed at each point in time.15 We are here interested in studying whether this
probability distribution converges to an equilibrium distribution when t ! 1, in
order to characterize the long-run probability distribution for employment, and thus
unemployment. Standard results assure that this is the case when the drift of the
Brownian motion of nominal-spending growth is positive, µ > 0.16 In this case, it can
be shown that the long-run cumulative distribution of Lt, denoted with P (¢); is given
by
P (L1 · x) =
µ
x
Lf=c(¢)
¶ 2µ
¾2y
for 0 · x · Lf=c(¢) where L1 denotes the long-run equilibrium level of employment.
Since ut = 1¡ Lt, we can also characterize the long-run equilibrium distribution for
the unemployment rate and evaluate its long-run mean
E[u1] = 1¡ 1
1 +
¾2y
2µ
(1¡ uf)
c(µ; ¾2y; ´; ½)
: (15)
To construct the long-run Phillips curve, a relationship between average wage
in‡ation and unemployment, we need to solve for the long-run equilibrium level of
wage in‡ation. From the equilibrium condition (10), we note that
d~yt = ¼
w
t + dlt
where ¼w is the rate of wage in‡ation. Since E(d~yt) = µ and lt converges to an
equilibrium distribution implying E(dl1) = 0, the long-run mean wage in‡ation rate
is given by
E[¼w1] = µ: (16)
Substituting (16) into (15), we obtain the long-run Phillips curve
E[u1] = 1¡ 1
1 +
¾2y
2E[¼w1]
(1¡ uf )
c(E[¼w1]; ¾2y; ´; ½)
(17)
15See Cox and Miller (1990, pp. 223-225) for a detailed derivation.
16Otherwise, when the mean of nominal-spending growth is non-positive, the probability dis-
tribution collapses to zero everywhere, with a spike of one at zero employment and thus 100%
unemployment rate in the long run. However, this is not a realistic case because nominal spending
growth is rarely negative, and µ represents its mean.
16
a relation between mean unemployment rate and mean wage in‡ation rate.
The long-run Phillips curve is no longer vertical and the “natural” rate of unem-
ployment is not unique, but depends on the mean in‡ation rate. When the mean wage
in‡ation rate is high, c(¢) is close to 1 and the average unemployment rate converges to
uf . Hence, the Phillips curve is virtually vertical for high in‡ation rates, and in these
cases there is virtually no long-run trade-o¤ between in‡ation and unemployment.
When instead wage in‡ation is low, a trade-o¤ emerges.
The shape of the long-run Phillips curve depends on the parameters of the model
´; ½; uf and ¾2y. It is important to note that ¾
2
y could in part be in‡uenced by sta-
bilization policies.17 Indeed, in the real world, volatility of nominal spending growth
is likely to result from real business cycle shocks, macroeconomic policies, and their
interaction. It follows that the relation between average wage in‡ation and unemploy-
ment depends in a critical way on policy parameters and the business cycle ‡uctua-
tions. An econometrician that observes realizations of in‡ation and unemployment at
low in‡ation rates might have hard time uncovering a natural rate of unemployment
as determined only by structural factors, unless macroeconomic volatility is properly
accounted for.18
When there is no uncertainty, ¾2y = 0 and c(¢) = 1; then the long-run unem-
ployment rate coincides with the ‡exible-wage unemployment rate. In the stochastic
case, the higher the variance of nominal-spending growth (¾2y), the more a fall in
the in‡ation rate would increase the average unemployment rate (generating a gap
with respect to the ‡exible-wage level). This results from two opposing forces. On
the one hand, a high variance-to-mean ratio of the nominal-expenditure shock (¾2y=µ)
increases the equilibrium level of unemployment, because the downward wage con-
straint is more binding and downward rigidities are more costly in terms of lower
employment. On the other hand, wage setters incorporate these costs by setting
lower wages when adjusting (c(¢) falls); this decreases the average unemployment
rate, because, as discussed in the previous section, employment can increase above
17Structural policies a¤ecting the degree of competition in the goods and labor markets could
a¤ect uf .
18The remainder of this section will focus on macroeconomic volatility. Regarding the other
paramenters, a higher discount rate (high ½) or a lower elasticity of labor supply (high ´) increase
the desired wage (higher c), and generates higher average unemployment, thus shifting the Phillips
curve to the right. Obviously, an increase in the structural unemployment that would prevail also
with ‡exible wages (uf ) would also shift the Phillips curve to the right.
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Figure 2: Long-run relationship between mean wage in‡ation rate, E[¼w], and mean
unemployment rate, E[u]; for di¤erent standard deviations of nominal spending
growth, ¾y. All variables in % and at annual rates; ´ = 2:5; ½ = 0:01 and uf = 6%.
the ‡exible-wage level when there are favorable shocks. However, the …rst channel
dominates the second one in the long run, and long-run average unemployment is
never below the natural rate, i.e. E[u1] ¸ uf since (1 + ¾2y=2µ) ¢ c(¢) ¸ 1:19 In Figure
2, for the same parameters’ con…guration as in Figure 1, we plot the Phillips curve
for di¤erent values of the standard deviation ¾y ranging from 0% to 20% at annual
rates. Wage in‡ation and unemployment are in percent and wage in‡ation is annu-
alized. For high in‡ation rates the Phillips curve is virtually vertical at uf , but for
low in‡ation rates it becomes ‡atter.20 When the standard deviation of the shocks
is higher, the long-run average unemployment rate is higher for the same long-run
19Indeed (1 + ¾2y=2µ) ¢ c(¢) ¸ 1 when ´ = 0, and c(¢) is non-decreasing function of ´, as shown in
the appendix.
20If we were to take into account the constraint that employment should not exceed 1, there would
be a kink in the Phillips curve at low in‡ation rates which would ‡atten the curve even more and
reinforce our results.
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average rate of wage in‡ation.21
¾y
¢E[u1] 0% 2% 5% 10% 15% 20%
Reduction in E[¼w1] from:
4% to 1% 0.0 0.0 0.4 3.4 9.5 16.9
5% to 2% 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 2.8 6.0
5% to 3% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0 2.3
6% to 3% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.1 2.7
Table 1: Increase in long-run mean unemployment rate, E[u1]; due to a reduction
in long-run mean wage in‡ation, E[¼w1]; for di¤erent standard deviations of nominal
spending growth, ¾y: All variables are in percent and at annual rates. (Authors’
calculations).
An illustrative example may be suggestive. On the basis of the parametrization
underlying Figure 2, a country that is subject to low macroeconomic volatility (say a
standard deviation of nominal GDP growth equal to 2%) may experience a negligible
increase in unemployment when average wage in‡ation declines from 6 to 3 percent or
even from 4 to 1 percent (see Table 1). However, a country with a signi…cant macro-
economic volatility (say 10 percent) may face a cost in term of average unemployment
of about 0.3% when in‡ation falls from 6 to 3 percent and of 3.4% when in‡ation falls
from 4 to 1 percent. And for a country with very high volatility, the costs would be
much higher. These calculations are purely illustrative: a more realistic assessment
would need to be based on much more complex models. Nonetheless they are still
indicative that signi…cant unemployment costs are likely to be associated with achiev-
ing price stability for countries with moderate or high volatility in nominal spending
growth.
21Our result that the long-run Phillips cuve is ‡atter when macroeconomic volatility is higher con-
trasts with the results of the model of Lucas (1973), where higher volatility reduces the information
content of relative price dispersion, and steepens the short-run Phillips curve.
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Such range of volatilities have not been unusual over the past three decades.
Several countries (mainly industrial ones, such as the U.S. and U.K.) exhibited low
volatility, as witnessed by a standard deviation of both nominal and real quarterly
GDP growth in the order of 2-3 percent. Other countries showed moderate levels at
around 4-6 percent (Sweden and Korea) and it was not uncommon to …nd …gures
between 5 and 10 percent (Ireland, and Thailand). Some countries had volatility in
excess of 10 percent (Israel) or even 20 percent (Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey).
Note that it is reasonable to expect that volatility of nominal GDP growth would
decline as in‡ation declines. Endogenizing volatility to in‡ation would then steepen
the Phillips curve. However, the decline in volatility is likely to be limited, and
mainly due to a reduction in volatility of in‡ation rather than the one of output
growth. Even at zero in‡ation, both in‡ation volatility and output growth volatility
would persist.22
6.2 Short-run Phillips curve
The long-run Phillips curve is located to the right of the unique employment level un-
der ‡exible wages, and it is tangent to such a level for high in‡ation rates. However,
the short-run Phillips curve (de…ned as the relation between average unemployment
and average in‡ation over a short period) would present a trade-o¤ also in the re-
gion where unemployment is below the ‡exible-case. The main reason lies in the
22To gauge the potential decline we estimated the relation between the 3-year standard deviation
of quarterly nominal GDP growth and the 3-year mean of quarterly GDP de‡ator in‡ation, in a
panel regression with …xed e¤ect and 9 periods over 1980-2006 for a sample of 24 industrial and 24
developing countries (from the IFS or WEO databases; for a subset of countries seasonal adjustment
was not available in the original dataset and was implemented on the basis of the X12 method in
EVIEWS). The relation was speci…ed in either linear or logarithmic terms and with or without time
e¤ects. The e¤ect of in‡ation on nominal GDP volatility was found to be positive and generally
signi…cant, although reasonably small. Additional regressions show that such an e¤ect was mainly
due to the e¤ect of in‡ation on in‡ation volatility rather than on real growth volatility. Indeed,
the e¤ect on real volatility was invariably smaller than the one on nominal volatility and generally
insigni…cant, while the one on in‡ation volatility was large and always signi…cant. Results were
quite similar when breaking the sample in industrial and developing countries. The largest e¤ect
of in‡ation on nominal volatility was found in the logarithmic speci…cation without time dummies,
with a coe¢cient of 0.23: a reduction in in‡ation by 10 percent (say from 10 to 9 percentage points)
would be associated with a much less than proportional decline in volatility (at most by 2.5 percent
of its initial level).
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endogenous upward rigidity described in Section 4: when agents can adjust their
wage upward, they will set it at a level below the one that would prevail under ‡exi-
ble wages (and employment would be above the ‡exible-case one), as they anticipate
the future binding e¤ect of such a wage choice. When wages are low (not likely to
be binding), the chance of a wage adjustment is high and on average unemployment
will be below the ‡exible-case one. When wages are high, the chance of a wage ad-
justment is small and on average unemployment will be above the ‡exible-case one.
Hence the shape of the short-run Phillips curve, and the chance that it will span in
areas when unemployment is below the ‡exible case, depend on how likely wages are
to be binding. The short-run Phillips curve would tend to shift to the right over
time, as the extent to which wages are likely to be binding would tend to increase
over time (until convergence to the long-run depicted in Fig. 2 is achieved). Indeed,
at the beginning of the agents’ horizon, agents would set the wage to a low level, for
the reasons discussed above. As time progresses, highly in‡ationary shocks would
raise the wage and make it more likely to be binding in the future, especially in a low
in‡ation environment (as characterized by the mean of the in‡ation process).
It is important to note that also the short-run Phillips curve implies a signi…cant
trade-o¤ between unemployment and wage in‡ation in a low-in‡ation environment,
and that such a trade-o¤ is again largely dependent on the degree of volatility present
in the economy. This is shown in Figure 3 for the same calibration as in Figure 2.23
Volatility would have two e¤ects on the short-run Phillips curve. First, it would
increase the chance of binding downward rigidities, thus increasing unemployment.
Second it would make agents more cautious in setting their wage claims. The …rst
e¤ect would dominate at low in‡ation levels (and is the one that would dominate
also in the long run), while the second one would dominate at moderate in‡ation
rates. Hence the relative positions of the short-run Phillips curve for countries with
di¤erent degrees of volatility would depend on the level of in‡ation: the country with
higher volatility would face a short-run trade-o¤ that is placed more to the right for
low in‡ation, and to the left for moderate in‡ation. As in‡ation increases however,
23Figure 3 is obtained through simulations of the model in which the …rst 400 observations are
repeated 10000 times, and µ varies in the range (0; 10] in percent and at annual rates. In the short
run, average wage in‡ation is slightly above µ for very low µ, so that the curves do not reach the
x-axis even when µ is close to zero. This is because agents are very cautious and set very low wages
at the beginning of the horizon when µ is very low, implying that upward adjustments would occur
quite frequently at the beginning of the horizon.
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Figure 3: Short-run relationship between mean wage in‡ation rate, E[¼w], and
mean unemployment rate, E[u]; for di¤erent standard deviations of nominal spending
growth, ¾y. All variables in % and at annual rates; ´ = 2:5; ½ = 0:01 and uf = 6%.
also the short-run Phillips curve converges to the ‡exible-wage employment level, so
that the curve becomes concave.
6.3 Varying the degree of downward rigidities
The main criticism of an approach that includes downward wage rigidities is that
this in‡exibility should disappear as the in‡ation rate declines toward zero (see the
comments to Akerlof et al., 1996, and Ball and Mankiw, 1994). As we discussed in
the introduction, there is now more evidence that downward wage rigidities persist
even during low in‡ation periods. Nonetheless, we explore the implications of a link
between the degree of downward rigidities and in‡ation, by replacing the assumption
dwjt ¸ 0 with
dwjt ¸ ¡·(µ)wjtdt (18)
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Figure 4: Long-run relationship between mean wage in‡ation rate, E[¼w], and mean
unemployment rate, E[u]; for di¤erent standard deviations of nominal spending
growth, ¾y under both the benchmark case (wages cannot fall) and the alternative
hypothesis in which wages can fall according to rules (18) and (19). All variables
(including ·1 below) in % and at annual rates; ´ = 2:5; ½ = 0:01, uf = 6%, ·1 = 1%
and ·2 = 0:1:
which nests the previous model. Nominal wages are now allowed to fall, but the
percentage decline cannot exceed ·(µ), where ·(µ) is a non-increasing function of the
mean of nominal-spending growth, µ. It is easy to see that the solution of the model
is similar to the previous case except that µ should now be replaced by ¸(µ) with
¸(µ) ´ µ + ·(µ).24 In particular, the long-run Phillips curve becomes
E[u1] = 1¡ 1
1 +
¾2y
2¸(E[¼w1])
(1¡ uf)
c(¸(E[¼w1]); ¾2y; ´; ½)
;
24In this case, the condition ensuring that the probability distributions converge to their equilib-
rium ones in the long run becomes ¸(µ) > 0. A supplementary appendix that presents the model
solution under this general case is available upon request.
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since it is still true that E[¼w1] = µ. Obviously the way in which the rigidities
endogenously decline (i.e. the functional form of ·(µ)) is crucial in shaping the Phillips
curve. For example if the percentage decline could not exceed a …xed amount ·1(hence
·(µ)=·1), then the Phillips curve would simply shift down by ·1 (when compared to
the one presented in Figure 2). If ·(µ) would increase as µ declines, as suggested by
the main argument against downward wage rigidities, the Phillips curve would tilt
clockwise at low in‡ation.25 For illustrative purposes, Figure 4 shows a Phillips curve
resulting from the following linear function
·(µ) = ·1 ¡ ·2µ (19)
where ·1 = 1% at annual rates and ·2 = 0:1. The unemployment costs of low in‡ation
would clearly decline, but would by no means disappear if macroeconomic volatility
is large.
7 Implications for long-run in‡ation and unem-
ployment volatilities
We discuss now other interesting implications of our model: i) volatility of wage
in‡ation increases as the rate of mean wage in‡ation increases; ii) volatility of unem-
ployment increases as the rate of mean wage in‡ation decreases; iii) as a consequence,
there is a long-run trade-o¤ between volatility of in‡ation and volatility of unemploy-
ment.
As discussed in Section 4, exogenous downward nominal wage rigidities imply
endogenous upward nominal wage rigidities, as a consequence of the optimizing be-
havior of wage setters. In the long run, the degree of overall rigidity is high when
wage in‡ation rate is low and when the variance of nominal spending shocks is high,
implying that nominal disturbances have strong e¤ects on real variables. At high
in‡ation rate or with very small variance of nominal spending, however, wages are
much more ‡exible, and monetary policy is virtually neutral.
25Obviously, if ·(µ) were to be very large for any theta, then the Phillips curve would become
virtually vertical, similarly to the ‡exible-wage case. However, as discussed extensively in the in-
troduction, there is substantial evidence that, at least in some countries, downward wage rigidities
persist even at low in‡ation.
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Figure 5: Plot of the long-run probability of wage rigidity, de…ned in (20), by varying
the mean wage in‡ation rate, E[¼w]; for di¤erent standard deviations of nominal
spending growth, ¾y. All variables in % and at annual rates; ´ = 2:5; ½ = 0:01,
uf = 6% and ² = 0:01.
To illustrate this point, we recall that lt follows a Brownian motion with a re‡ect-
ing barrier at ln(Lf=c(¢)) and that the barrier is reached when wages are adjusted
upward. Hence, the probability that wages are rigid is given by P (0 · Lt < Lf=c(¢)).
Since the probability distribution function of Lt is continuous, this can be approxi-
mated by P (0 · Lt · Lf=c(¢) ¡ ²) for a small ² > 0: Focusing on the long run, we
obtain that
P (0 · L1 · Lf=c(¢)¡ ²) =
µ
1¡ ²c(¢)
Lf
¶ 2µ
¾2y ¼ 1¡ 2E[¼
w
1]
¾2y
c(¢)
Lf
² (20)
which shows that when wage in‡ation is very low, the probability that wages remain
…xed is close to one (Figure 5 plots the long-run probability that wages remain …xed
against the long-run mean wage in‡ation rate, for di¤erent variances of nominal-
spending growth). Similarly when the variance of nominal spending is high, the
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probability gets also close to one. The probability declines when in‡ation increases,
and it declines faster when macroeconomic volatility is lower.
This has clear implications for the long-run volatilities of in‡ation and unemploy-
ment. Indeed, as shown in Figure 6, the volatility of wage in‡ation is low when the
mean in‡ation rate is low (for given volatility of nominal-spending growth), but in-
creases when mean in‡ation increases.26 By the same token, at low in‡ation rates,
nominal expenditure a¤ects the real allocation, causing large ‡uctuations of employ-
ment and output, since wages are sticky. Using the long-run probability distribution,
it is possible to show that the variance of the long-run unemployment rate is given
26When the mean of nominal expenditure growth is high, long-run mean wage in‡ation is high
and wages tend to adjust always and proportionally to nominal expenditure shocks, so that the
volatility of nominal wages converges to the volatility of nominal expenditure growth, as shown in
Figure 6.
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by
V ar[u1] =
1
2
³
1 +
¾2y
E[¼w1]
´³
1 + E[¼
w1]
2¾2y
´2 µ Lfc(E[¼w1]; ¾2y; ´; ½)
¶2
Figure 7 shows (for di¤erent choices of ¾y) that the volatility of unemployment is
high when in‡ation is low, and decreases as in‡ation increases (because in this second
case, unemployment will converge to the ‡exible-wage level). These two results imply
the presence of a long-run trade-o¤ between the variability of in‡ation and that of
unemployment, for given volatility of nominal spending growth (as shown in Figure
8). 27
27Note, however, that when in‡ation is really low (nominal spending growth close to zero) the
unemployment distribution collapses to a mass at 100% unemployment rate. In this limiting case
the volatility of unemployment collapses to zero and the trade-o¤ between volatilities disappears.
28
Trade-o¤s of this nature have been generally assumed in monetary policy analysis
over the past thirty years (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983).
Woodford (2003) has recently provided microfoundation for these trade-o¤s and for
their link to the monetary reaction functions that have been so widely employed in
in‡ation targeting models. However, in our model this trade-o¤ is a feature of the
global equilibria and not just of the local approximation as in Woodford (2003).
8 Conclusions
This paper o¤ers a theoretical foundation for the long-run Phillips curve in a modern
framework. It introduces downward nominal wage rigidities in a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model with forward-looking agents and ‡exible-goods prices. The
main di¤erence with respect to current monetary models is that nominal rigidities are
assumed to be asymmetric rather than symmetric (and on wages rather than prices).28
Downward nominal rigidities have been advocated for a long time as a justi…cation for
the Phillips curve, but with weak theoretical and empirical support. Over the past
decade and a half, a substantial body of theoretical and empirical research across
numerous countries (see Akerlof, 2007, Bewley, 1999, Holden, 2004, and references
therein) has o¤ered a conceptual justi…cation for these rigidities and has con…rmed
not only their existence, but also their relevance in a low in‡ation environment.
This paper o¤ers a closed-form solution uncovering a highly non-linear relationship
for the long-run trade-o¤ between average in‡ation and unemployment: the trade-
o¤ is virtually inexistent at high in‡ation rates, while it becomes relevant in a low
in‡ation environment. The relation shifts with several factors, and in particular with
the degree of macroeconomic volatility. In a country with signi…cant macroeconomic
stability, the Phillips curve is virtually vertical also at low in‡ation. However, a
country with moderate to high volatility may face a substantial costs in terms of
unemployment if attempting to reach price stability.29
Note also that this reversal occurs only in the long run: in the short run we always …nd a clear
trade-o¤.
28See Blanchard (1997) and Erceg et al. (2000) for a discussion on the importance of assuming
rigidities in wages rather than prices in modern macro models.
29With respect to the other parameters of the model, the Phillips curve would ‡atten when labor
elasticity is lower and agents heavily discount the future; it would steepen if the degree of downward
rigidities weakens at low in‡ation; and it would shift outward if labor and goods market competition
29
It is interesting to note that the forward-looking behavior of optimizing agents
in the presence of downward wage rigidities generates an endogenous tendency for
upward wage rigidities. Indeed, when choosing the wage increase in the presence of
an in‡ationary shock, agents anticipate the negative e¤ect of downward rigidities on
their future employment opportunities, and thus moderate their wage adjustment.
Hence, in our model the overall degree of wage rigidity is endogenously stronger at
low in‡ation rates and disappears at high in‡ation rates, while in time-dependent
models of price rigidities, prices remain sticky even in a high-in‡ation environment.
The endogenous wage rigidity introduces a trade-o¤ also between the volatility of
unemployment and the one of in‡ation.
The degree to which downward rigidities soften when in‡ation declines can reduce
the extent of the trade-o¤ (as argued by Mankiw and Ball, 1994). However, numer-
ous recent empirical studies have con…rmed the persistence of such rigidities at low
in‡ation for various countries. More evidence would be nonetheless useful to assess
the degree of such persistence and the corresponding implications for the trade-o¤.
Several policy implications arise. First, not every country should target the same
in‡ation rate: di¤erences in, among other things, the degree of macroeconomic volatil-
ity should matter for the choice of the in‡ation rate. Countries subject to larger
macroeconomic volatility (such as numeours emerging markets and developing coun-
tries) may …nd it desirable to target a higher in‡ation rate than countries exhibiting
low volatility. And as the degree of volatility changes over time, the in‡ation target
may need to be adjusted. Second, policymakers can in‡uence the in‡ation unem-
ployment trade-o¤: stabilization policies aimed at reducing macroeconomic volatility
would improve the trade-o¤, thus reducing the unemployment costs of lowering long-
run in‡ation.
It is useful to highlight that multiple sectors are not necessary for downward
rigidities to generate a trade-o¤ between in‡ation and unemployment, unlike com-
monly thought (see for example Akerlof et al. 1996). An intertemporal stochastic
framework is su¢cient, as it generates the need for intertemporal relative price ad-
justments. Obviously, multiple sectors would increase the relevance of the downward
nominal rigidities, because they would generate additional need for relative price
adjustment (intratemporal), which could be achieved via in‡ation.
The results suggest that the “Great Moderation” experienced by the U.S. over
weakens.
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the past two decades may have signi…cantly steepened the Phillips curve in the U.S.,
making it even more unlikely that empirical analyses would uncover such a curve,
thus potentially strengthening the case for the conventional view of a vertical long-
run curve in this country. However, this does not need to apply to other countries.
Indeed, macroeconomic volatility is typically larger in emerging markets, pointing to a
more costly trade-o¤ at low in‡ation. It may then not be surprising that Groshen and
Schweitzer (1997) and Card and Hyslop (1996) …nd that the grease e¤ect of in‡ation
are not particularly relevant for the U.S., while Fehr and Gotte (2005) …nd that
downward wage rigidities are very relevant for Switzerland. Surely some emerging
markets (such as Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey) that experienced highly volatility of
nominal GDP over the past decades may enjoy lower volatility going forward if, other
things equal, in‡ation stays low. However, their macroeconomic volatility is unlikely
to reach the low to moderate levels of, say, U.S. and U.K. simply as a result of a
decline in in‡ation.
A recent literature has shown that ignorance of the model economy can lead to
very costly choices (Primiceri, 2006; Sargent, 2007). Primiceri (2006) argues that
the explanation for the large increase in in‡ation and unemployment in the 1970s
relates to the government’s misperception about, among other things, the presence
of a trade-o¤ between unemployment and in‡ation. But this argument would work
also in reverse. While our results would concur on the lack of such a trade-o¤ at
the high in‡ation levels of the 1970s, they would point at the risk of an opposite
misperception (ignoring the presence of a trade-o¤) in low in‡ation periods, a risk
that can result in signi…cantly higher unemployment if countries subjec to sizable
volatility were to aim for price stability. More generally Cogley and Sargent (2005)
o¤ers a view in which policymakers have doubts about the true model of the economy
and can assign a positive probability to a model in which there is a long-run trade-o¤,
and Sargent (2008) concludes that a “reason for assigning an in‡ation target to the
monetary authority is to prevent it from doing what it might want to do because it
has a misspeci…ed model”. Our analysis would suggest that the probability that the
true model should encompass a long-run trade-o¤ should be made dependent on both
the rate of wage in‡ation and the volatility of nominal spending growth.
Our model is also related to another important controversy in modern macroeco-
nomics: whether nominal spending shocks have persistent real e¤ects. In particular,
recent monetary models that have tried to match the highly volatile movements in in-
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dividual prices observed in U.S. data (such as Golosov and Lucas, 2007) and conclude
that nominal shocks have only transient e¤ects on real activity at any level of in‡a-
tion. In our model, nominal shocks can have high persistent real e¤ects, especially
at low in‡ation rates, since downward wage in‡exibility is accompanied by a high
degree of upward wage rigidity; as in‡ation increases, rigidity decreases and so does
persistence. This suggests that a menu-cost model á la Golosov and Lucas (2007)
would have di¤erent implications with regards the real e¤ects of nominal shocks if it
were to encompass downward wage in‡exibility.
Of course the trade-o¤ between in‡ation and unemployment is bound to be much
more complex that what illustrated through our stylized model. But there is no pre-
sumption that a more complicated model would eliminate the trade-o¤, as long as
downward rigidities are included. Adding standard symmetric goods-price rigidities
would introduce an argument for in‡ation as “sand” as in modern monetary models
(see for example Woodford, 2003), as it would introduce price dispersion. Allowing
for heterogeneity of sectoral shocks would strengthen the argument for in‡ation as
“grease” as it would increase the need for relative price adjustments. Including a
game-theoretic interaction between price setters and monetary authorities would un-
leash the comparison of discretionary versus commitment equilibria, and by allowing
for the incentive of monetary authorities to generate surprise in‡ation (in order to
reduce ex-post the unemployment consequences of past negative shocks) could iden-
tify an equilibrium level of in‡ation (in the presence of in‡ation costs), but would not
make the Phillips curve vertical. Extending the model to an open economy frame-
work would allow for features which are more realistic for many countries, especially
emerging markets. Allowing for the downward rigidity to last for a …nite length of
time would steepen the Phillips curve, as it would limit the average e¤ect on un-
employment of any given negative shock (note however, that the anticipation of a
rigidity that is only temporary would also reduce the incentive towards the endoge-
nous upward rigidity). Overall, an optimal in‡ation rate for policymakers of di¤erent
countries can only be assessed through more complicated models encompassing the
above features among many others (such as persistence of shocks, additional e¤ects
of in‡ation on the economy, and so on), which are left for future work.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of conditions (14)
Let W the space of non-decreasing non-negative stochastic processes fwt(j)}. This
is the space of processes that satisfy the constraint (13). First we show that the
objective function is concave over a convex set. To show that the set is convex, note
that if x 2 W and y 2 W then ¿x + (1 ¡ ¿)y 2 W for each ¿ 2 [0; 1]: Since the
objective function is
Et0
½Z 1
t0
e¡½(t¡t0)¼(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)dt
¾
and ¼(¢) is concave in the …rst-argument, the objective function is concave in fwt(j)g
since it is the integral of concave functions.
Let fw¤t (j)} be a process belonging to W that maximizes (11) and V (¢) the asso-
ciated value function de…ned by
V (wt(j);Wt; ~Yt) = maxfw¿ (j)g2W
Et
½Z 1
t
e¡½(¿¡t)¼(w¿ (j);W¿ ; ~Y¿ )d¿
¾
:
We now characterize the properties of the optimal process fw¤t (j)g: The Bellman
equation for the wage-setter problem can be written as
½V (wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)dt = max
dwt(j)
¼(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)dt+ EtfdV (wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)g (A.1)
subject to
dwt(j) ¸ 0 (A.2)
From Ito’s Lemma we obtain that
EtfdV (wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)g = EtfVw(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)dwt(j) + VW (wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)dWt +
+Vy(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)d~Yt +
1
2
Vyy(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)(d ~Yt)
2 +
+
1
2
VWW (wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)(dWt)
2 + VyW (wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)dWtd ~Ytg
EtfdV (wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)g = Vw(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)dwt(j) + VW (wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)EtdWt + (A.3)
+Vy(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt) ~Ytµ
0dt+
1
2
Vyy(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt) ~Y
2
t ¾
2
ydt+
+
1
2
VWW (wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)Et(dWt)
2 + VyW (wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)EtdWtd~Yt
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since dwt(j) has …nite variation implying (dwt(j))2 = dwt(j)dWt = dwt(j)d~Yt = 0.
We have de…ned µ0 ´ µ + 1
2
¾2y. Substituting (A.3) into (A.1) and maximizing over
dwt(j) we obtain the complementary slackness condition:
Vw(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt) · 0
for each t and
Vw(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt) = 0
for each t when dwt(j) > 0. We can write (A.1) as
½V (wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)dt = ¼(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)dt+ VW (wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)EtdWt +
+Vy(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt) ~Ytµ
0dt+
1
2
Vyy(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt) ~Y
2
t ¾
2
ydt+
+
1
2
VWW (wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)Et(dWt)
2 + VyW (wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)EtdWtd~Yt
which can be di¤erentiated with respect to wt(j) to obtain
½Vw(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)dt = ¼w(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)dt+ VWw(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)EtdWt + (A.4)
+Vyw(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt) ~Ytµ
0dt+
1
2
Vyyw(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt) ~Y
2
t ¾
2
ydt+
+
1
2
VWWw(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)Et(dWt)
2 + VyWw(wt(j);Wt; ~Yt)EtdWtd~Yt:
Since the objective is concave and the set of constraints is convex, the optimal choice
for wt(j) is unique. It follows that wt(j) = Wt for each j: Thus dwt(j) = dWt and
dWt has also …nite variation. Moreover, super-contact conditions (see Dixit, 1991,
and Dumas, 1991) require that when dWt > 0
Vww(Wt;Wt; ~Yt) = 0;
VwW (Wt;Wt; ~Yt) = 0;
Vwy(Wt;Wt; ~Yt) = 0:
It follows that we can write (A.4) as
½v(Wt; ~Yt) = ~¼w(Wt; ~Yt) + vy(Wt; ~Yt) ~Ytµ
0 +
1
2
vyy(Wt; ~Yt) ~Y
2
t ¾
2
y (A.5)
where we have de…ned v(Wt; ~Yt) ´ Vw(Wt;Wt; ~Yt) and
~¼w(Wt; ~Yt) ´ kw
24 1
Wt
1
¹p
¡ ¹w
Ã
~Yt
¹pWt
!1+´
1
Wt
35 ;
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with kw ´ 1¡ µw: In particular we can de…ne the function W ( ~Yt) such that
v(W ( ~Yt); ~Yt) = 0 (A.6)
vw(W ( ~Yt); ~Yt) = 0; (A.7)
vy(W ( ~Yt); ~Yt) = 0; (A.8)
when dWt > 0 while v(Wt; ~Yt) · 0 when dWt = 0. We now solve for the functions
W ( ~Yt) and v(Wt; ~Yt): Thus we seek for functions W ( ~Yt) and v(Wt; ~Yt) that satis…es
(A.5) and the boundary conditions (A.6)–(A.8). A particular solution to (A.5) is
given by
vp(Wt; ~Yt) =
kw
½
1
Wt
1
¹p
¡ kw
½¡ µ0(1 + ´)¡ 1
2
(1 + ´)´¾2y
¹w
Ã
~Yt
¹pWt
!1+´
1
Wt
while in this case the complementary solution has the form
vc(Wt; ~Yt) = W
¡1¡°
t
~Y °t
where ° is a root that satis…es the following characteristic equation
1
2
°2¾2 + °µ ¡ ½ = 0 (A.9)
i.e.
° =
¡µ +
p
µ2 + 2½¾2
¾2
:
Since whenWt ! 1 and/or ~Yt ! 0, the length of time until the next wage adjustment
can be made arbitrarily long with probability arbitrarily close to one (see Stokey,
2007), then it should be the case that
lim
Wt!1
[v(Wt; ~Yt)¡ vP (Wt; ~Yt)] = 0
lim
Yt!0
[v(Wt; ~Yt)¡ vP (Wt; ~Yt)] = 0
which both require that ° should be positive. The general solution is then given by
the sum of the particular and the complementary solution, so that
v(Wt; ~Yt) =
kw
½
1
Wt
1
¹p
¡ kw
½¡ µ0(1 + ´)¡ 1
2
(1 + ´)´¾2y
¹w
Ã
~Yt
¹pWt
!1+´
1
Wt
+ kW¡1¡°t ~Y
°
t
(A.10)
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for a constant k to be determined. Since
vw(Wt; ~Yt) = ¡kw
½
1
W 2t
1
¹p
+
kw(2 + ´)
½¡ µ0(1 + ´)¡ 1
2
(1 + ´)´¾2y
¹w
Ã
~Yt
¹pWt
!1+´
1
W 2t
¡(1+°)kW¡2¡°t ~Y °t
(A.11)
and
vy(Wt; ~Yt) = ¡kw 1 + ´
½¡ µ0¹w
Ã
~Yt
¹pWt
!1+´
1
~YtWt
+ °kW¡1¡°t ~Y
°¡1
t ; (A.12)
the boundary conditions (A.6)–(A.8) imply
kw
½
1
¹p
¡ kw
½¡ µ0(1 + ´)¡ 1
2
(1 + ´)´¾2y
¹w
Ã
~Yt
¹pWt( ~Yt)
!1+´
+k
Ã
~Yt
Wt( ~Yt)
!°
= 0; (A.13)
¡kw
½
1
¹p
+
kw(2 + ´)
½¡ µ0(1 + ´)¡ 1
2
(1 + ´)´¾2y
¹w
Ã
~Yt
¹pWt( ~Yt)
!1+´
¡(1+°)k
Ã
~Yt
Wt( ~Yt)
!°
= 0;
(A.14)
¡kw 1 + ´
½¡ µ0(1 + ´)¡ 1
2
(1 + ´)´¾2y
¹w
Ã
~Yt
¹pWt( ~Yt)
!´
+ °k
Ã
~Yt
Wt( ~Yt)
!°¡1
= 0: (A.15)
Note that this is a set of three equations, two of which are independent.30 They
determine k and the function Wt( ~Yt): In particular, we obtain that
Wt( ~Yt) = c¹
1
1+´
w ¹
¡ ´
1+´
p
~Yt
where
c ´
Ã
° ¡ ´ ¡ 1
°
½
½¡ µ0(1 + ´)¡ 1
2
(1 + ´)´¾2y
! 1
1+´
:
Using (A.9), we can write
c(µ; ¾2y; ´; ½) =
Ã
µ + 1
2
°(µ; ¾2y; ½)¾
2
y
µ + 1
2
(°(µ; ¾2y; ½) + ´ + 1)¾
2
y
! 1
1+´
which shows that 0 < c(µ; ¾2y; ´; ½) · 1.
In the main text, we use the result that c(¢) is non decreasing in ´. Note that the
derivative of c(¢) with respect to ´ is
30In fact, the homogenous function has been chosen appropriately for this purpose.
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¡c(µ; ¾
2
y; ´; ½)
(1 + ´)2
¢
Ã
ln
µ + 1
2
°(µ; ¾2y; ½)¾
2
y
µ + 1
2
(°(µ; ¾2y; ½) + ´ + 1)¾
2
y
+
1
2
(1 + ´) ¾2y
µ + 1
2
(°(µ; ¾2y; ½) + ´ + 1)¾
2
y
!
which is always non-negative because the terms in the round bracket can be written
as
ln z + 1¡ z
which is always non-positive for any z.
Moreover note that c(µ; ¾2y; ´; ½) = c(¾
2
y=µ; ´; ½=µ) since °(µ; ¾
2
y; ½) = °(¾
2
y=µ; ½=µ):
A.2 Adding the employment constraint 0 · ljt · 1
Having computed the optimum without the constraint 0 · ljt · 1; we can now study
how the solution changes when employment is enforced not to exceed maximum
employment. The optimization problem is still concave under a convex set. The
solution will be unique, so it should be that 0 · ljt = Lt · 1. In the unconstrained
optimum we have shown that
Wt ¸ c¹
1
1+´
w ¹
¡ ´
1+´
p
~Yt:
Combining it with
Lt =
1
¹p
~Yt
Wt
we obtain
Lt · ¹
¡ 1
1+´
w ¹
´
1+´
p
c¹p
=
1¡ uf
c
:
Hence, c cannot be smaller than 1 ¡ uf , otherwise Lt > 1. By the concavity of the
optimization problem, it follows that if the desired c is below 1 ¡ uf , then Wt =
c¤¹
1
1+´
w ¹
¡ ´
1+´
p
~Yt when dWt > 0 where c¤ = 1¡ uf . In particular, we obtain now that
W ( ~Yt) = c
¤(µ; ¾2y; ´; ±; u
f) ¢ ¹
1
1+´
w ¹
¡ ´
1+´
p
~Yt
= c¤(µ; ¾2y; ´; ±; u
f) ¢W ft
where c¤(¢) is a function of the model parameters as follows
c¤(µ; ¾2y; ´; ±; u
f ) =
(
c(µ; ¾2y; ´; ±) if c ¸ 1¡ uf
1¡ uf if c < 1¡ uf
:
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